【新唐人2014年11月19日讯】中共军队2011年在香港大帽山顶兴建的球形建筑，外界一直以为是用来侦察香港上空的雷达站，日前却被外国杂志踢爆，原来是监控港人的情报侦搜站，是凡通过无线电传输的各种讯号都可能遭到监听、记录。
最新一期加拿大军事杂志《汉和防务评论》报导称，中共军队的监听站位于香港大帽山顶，海拔950公尺，外观象普通的导航或气象雷达站，但经讯号情报专家前往现场观察，发现巨球型天线整流罩的直径长达15.63公尺，远远超过一般雷达站所需。
报导说，这个监听站可针对香港民众的手机、WIFI、电子邮件、无线电电话、电传等通讯系统进行截获、监听，整个监听设施相当庞大，凡是通过无线电传输的各种通讯信号，都可能被监听、记录。
香港作家张成觉：“它(中共)要比较直接的或密切的掌握香港人的想法和动态，其中手机监测应该是很重要的方面，总的来说，对香港这个地方不放心，但是它又不能够搞一些太明显的干预香港人的日常生活，或者是香港的法治、自由这些方面的事务，它们也不能做的太露骨，要是在山顶搞这样的装置的话，相对来说，一般人就不会注意或者发觉不到，它们就可以为所欲为。”
报导还指出，整流罩内的天线涵盖了整个香港，重点应该是用来监听香港民主派人士，以及外国使领馆的电话、手机、电传讯号。
旅美中国社会问题研究人士张健：“中共在目前这样一个民主潮流，把它越来越孤立的情况之下，中共肯定是要加强它的统治地位，它自己本身知道，中共并没有合法性，所以它把所有的民主国家的人都变成它的敌人，它在惶惶不可终日当中去执政，它一定是要知道人们想的是什么，人们如何去推翻它。包括箝制人的言论，引导人们的思想，然后制定出洗脑的方案。”
《汉和防务评论》创办人平可夫表示，这是典型的解放军总参谋部技术侦察部（总参三部）建设的讯号情报监听天线，整流罩的基本结构与总参三部在新疆喀什、西藏中印边界设立的监听站类似。
平可夫强调，这根本不是什么雷达站，因为雷达站的天线越高越好，俯仰角的涵盖范围也应该是空旷的，但香港这个天线整流罩的位置低矮，“这样的设计，对接收无线电讯号的目标而言，足以胜任”。
报导指出，监听站也可能监听香港政界人物的电话通讯，香港政府不可能知道这是什么样的基地。
张成觉：“它不一定要通知香港政府，因为这样的事情知道的人越多，对它没有好处，何况它们根本没有把香港政府看作是一个值得信赖依靠的角色，而且香港政界里面有些高层人士的手机，它们也会监听，它当然不希望让香港特区政府知道这个情况。”
张健：“有可能香港政府并不知道，因为中共虽然一手扶植了香港政府，但是中共对香港政府是从来不放心的，因为扶植的人和中共自己的人，这在中共内部意识形态里面，他们有本质的区别，说白了，香港这些人并没有双手沾满人民的鲜血，不能进入到中共真正的核心内部。”
平可夫17号还向香港《苹果日报》透露，台湾民众的通讯也在中共的掌控之中，《汉和防务评论》明年2月号会有完整的报导。
据了解，《苹果日报》7月曾报导，驻港中共军队3年前在大帽山顶获得港府批地10万呎，秘密兴建军用雷达设施和军营，有军人长期驻守，却从没有对外公布。
据香港《信报》报导，港府月前书面回复质询时，拒绝评论大帽山军事用途详情，只表示，驻港军队一直在香港履行防务职责，防务活动的具体资料属军事机密，不便公开。
采访/易如 编辑/陈洁 后制/陈建铭
Report: PLA Monitor Telecommunications in Hong Kong
A dome built by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2011
at Tai Mo Shan, Hong Kong’s highest mountain, thought to be
a radar station, was recently reported to be a surveillance
station to intercept and record any radio signals in Hong Kong.
The latest Canada-based military affairs magazine,
Kanwa Asian Defence Monthly, reported a surveillance station
on top of Tai Mo Shan, 950 meters above sea level.
Experts analyzed, the dome measures 15.63 in diameter
and is far larger than aviation or weather radar.
Kanwa said the facility can intercept and record signals from
cellular phones, Wi-Fi networks and radios.
The size is large enough to listen to and record a variety of
communication signals through radio transmission.
Hong Kong writer Zhang Chengjue: “Cellular monitoring
should be very important to directly or closely grasp
the thoughts and movements of Hong Kongers.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worries about Hong Kong,
but does not want to intervene too obviously in the daily lives,
the law and freedom of Hong Kongers.
A facility on the mountain top is relatively less obvious or noticeable.
They can do whatever they want."
Kanwa also noted that the antenna covers the entire Hong Kong,
supposedly to tap the communications of the democracy camp
and foreign embassies.
US-based China social issue researcher Zhang Jian:
“In the current trend of democracy,
CCP is faced with increasing isolation.
Surely it works hard to strengthen its rule,
knowing that it lacks legality.
People in the democratic countries are its enemies.
It rules with anxiety, fearing people’s thoughts and ideas
will overthrow it.
It also develops its brainwashing program
just to clamp down on people’s words and guide their minds."
Andrei Chang said the installation is a typical intelligence
antenna of the PLA’s Unit 61398.
It is similar to other data mining facilities established
in Kashgar in the restive Xinjiang and Tibet
and along the border with India.
Andrei Chang stressed, because the higher the antenna
the better for a radar station;
the coverage area of the pitch angle should also be open.
But the position of the PLA facility is low and quite sufficient
to receive radio signals in Hong Kong.
Kanwa pointed out the facility could target telecommunication
of politicians and the HKSAR might not be aware of it.
Zhang Chengjue: “It does not have to notify the Hong Kong
government. It’s no good having too many people aware of this.
Besides, HKSAR was never a trustworthy entity to them.
Some executive politicians could also be monitored.
Of course they would not want the HKSAR know anything about it."
Zhang Jian: “It is likely the Hong Kong government does not
know anything about it.
Although CCP single-handedly propped up the HKSAR,
but never was assured.
To CCP ideology, there are essential differences between
the ones they cultivated and their own.
Frankly, these Hong Kongers have not stained their hands
with the blood of the people.
They will not really enter the inside core of the CCP."
Andrei Chang told Hong Kong’s Apple Daily,
communications in Taiwan are monitored by the CCP.
Relevant coverage will be available in Kanwa’s February issue
next year.
Apple Daily reported in July that HKSAR granted
a 100,000 sq ft area on top of Tai Mo Shan to the PLA.
The secret construction of military radar and barracks
stationed by military personnel was never announced .
Hong Kong Economic Journal, ejinsight, reported HKSAR has
declined to comment on the military usage on Tai Mo Shan
in a written reply last month.
It only stated that the PLA has been carrying out its defense
duties in Hong Kong.
As for details of the activities it will not be convenient
to reveal due to the nature of military secrets.
Interview/YiRu Edit/ChenJie Post-Production/Chen Jianming
