【新唐人2012年5月23日訊】在中共以槍桿子和筆桿子當家的理論中，軍隊一直在中共的權鬥中扮演一個最重要的角色。今年的十八大也不列外，一度傳出十八大會宣佈「軍隊國家化」，同時軍隊效忠胡錦濤的聲音也不絕於耳。另外，從最近結束的一些省委常委換屆來看，大部分沒有了軍方常委的位置。軍隊未來將在中國扮演甚麼樣的角色﹖引起了外界的關注。
中共四川省委十屆一次全會5月19號，產生了新一屆省委常委領導班子。與此前完成換屆的陝西、海南省委常委會一樣，應配備13名常委的四川省委只有12位，沒有了以前的「軍方常委」。
時政評論員藍述表示，王立軍、薄熙來事件和陳光誠事件的出現，可能會使中共高層在人事安排和一些決策方面重新安排。
時政評論員 藍述：「中共的高層很難在各個方面都一下子達成一致，留一些位置，是不是因為中共高層各派目前還在討價還價﹖」
原「山東大學」歷史系教授劉因全認為，可能是這些省的「軍方常委」面臨退休，而新的還沒有確定，他認為，如果要補的話一定是「胡、溫、習」的人馬。
不過，劉因全分析，十七大前個別省級常委中，也出現過沒有軍方代表的現象，因此，這屆很可能不會再補上。劉因全還表示，軍方對地方政府的干預應該越來越少。
劉因全：「我認為這是一個趨勢，如果現在開始這樣做，這是一個進步，部隊就是部隊，你像美國這裡哪有一個司令員去管地方的事的，我們從歷史上看，部隊在中國政治舞臺上的作用是越來越小的，它是淡化的，像文革時期，那個時候好多省委書記、革委會主任都是部隊的人。」
中共喉舌《人民日報》這一段時間一直強調，中共30年的改革先易後難，已經進入攻堅階段。
藍述分析，十八大中共高層的人事安排，很可能不會再按照中共傳統模式進行搭配。
藍述：「看這個樣子，都和軍方今後的定位有關係，習近平他本人是軍隊背景，又有傳出消息說，很可能十八大的改革會把軍隊國家化，可是從另一方面，軍頭都在紛紛效忠胡錦濤，不斷有風聲放出，胡錦濤卸任了之後還會任一段時間的軍委主席，軍隊的這些領導人將在黨委裡扮演一個甚麼樣的角色，確實是值得觀察的。」
按照慣例，中國除少數省級行政區域，如西藏外，多數省級黨委常委的配備都是“1+2+10”模式，也就是1位書記，2位副書記，再加上10位常委，其中有一位是軍方常委。
採訪編輯/劉惠/後製/薛莉
Military Seats Cut In CCP Provincial Standing Committees
A 『gun』 and a 『pen』 are the two most crucial tools for
the Chinese Communists Party(CCP)’s ruling in China.
The armed forces have long been deemed the most
important in the CCP’s infighting for power.
The CCP18th Congress is no exception—at the conference,
“Military Nationalization” may be announced, say rumors.
Meanwhile, the army’s oaths of allegiance to Hu Jintao
keep hitting headlines.
Several provinces have seen a cut to the military seats in its
provincial standing committees, from the CCP’s recent shifts.
What a role will the army play in China’s near future?——
This question is arousing the public’s attention.
The 10th CCP Sichuan Provincial Committee’s first plenary
session generated new Standing Committee leaders.
The Party’s new Standing Committee has cut one military
seat to 12 members, from the previous 13.
Shanxi and Hainan Provinces have seen the same cuts
in the leadership transitions.
Critic Lan Shu says, exposures of the Wang Lijun, Bo Xilai
and Chen Guangcheng incidents may have triggered the
CCP’s new personnel and decision-making arrangements.
Lan Shu: “The CCP’s top-level leadership can hardly reach
agreement in all aspects.
Are they leaving some positions unfilled because the top
factional bargaining is still going on within the CCP?”
Former history professor at Shandong Univ., Liu Yinquan,
says these provincial standing committees’ military members
may be facing retirement and new members not yet finalized.
The successful candidates must be minions of Hu Jintao,
Wen Jiabao or Xin Jinping, according to Liu.
Liu observed that the same phenomena had occurred
on the eve of the CCP’s 17th congress.
Liu thinks the position is not likely to be filled during this fall』s
leadership reshuffle.
Liu predicts that, intervention from the military force
with the CCP’s local authorities shall become less and less.
Liu Yinquan: “I think this is a trend; it will be a progress
if it is put into practice from now on.
The troops should keep their own nature, like here in the U.S.
where no commanders intervene with local administration.
Historically, the local authorities’ military’s role has become
increasingly diluted.
In the Cultural Revolution, many provincial Party secretaries
and Revolutionary Committee directors were from the army.”
CCP mouthpiece media, People’s Daily, has recently been
stressing that,
the CCP’s 30-year reform has been going from easy to hard,
and is now entering the crucial stage.
Lan Shu says the top personnel for its18th Congress
will not follow what it was previously.
Lan Shu: “Looks like it’s all linked to the military’s positioning
in the near future; Xi Jinping has a military background.
There came another rumor saying that at the 18th Congress meeting,
The Nationalization of the troops might be announced.
On the other side, the military chiefs have repeatedly
pledged loyalty to Hu Jintao.
Hu is reportedly staying on as the Military Commission head
after leaving office.
What roles will military leaders play in the Party Committee?
—Let’s wait and see.”
Except for in a few provincial administrative areas like Tibet,
the CCP’s usual structure of its provincial Party Committees
are “1-2-10”—1 Party secretary, 2 deputy secretaries and
10 Standing Committee members, with 1 from the military.
