【新唐人2014年11月19日訊】中共軍隊2011年在香港大帽山頂興建的球形建築，外界一直以為是用來偵察香港上空的雷達站，日前卻被外國雜誌踢爆，原來是監控港人的情報偵搜站，是凡通過無線電傳輸的各種訊號都可能遭到監聽、記錄。

最新一期加拿大軍事雜誌《漢和防務評論》報導稱，中共軍隊的監聽站位於香港大帽山頂，海拔950公尺，外觀象普通的導航或氣象雷達站，但經訊號情報專家前往現場觀察，發現巨球型天線整流罩的直徑長達15.63公尺，遠遠超過一般雷達站所需。

報導說，這個監聽站可針對香港民眾的手機、WIFI、電子郵件、無線電電話、電傳等通訊系統進行截獲、監聽，整個監聽設施相當龐大，凡是通過無線電傳輸的各種通訊信號，都可能被監聽、記錄。

香港作家張成覺：「它(中共)要比較直接的或密切的掌握香港人的想法和動態，其中手機監測應該是很重要的方面，總的來說，對香港這個地方不放心，但是它又不能夠搞一些太明顯的干預香港人的日常生活，或者是香港的法治、自由這些方面的事務，它們也不能做的太露骨，要是在山頂搞這樣的裝置的話，相對來說，一般人就不會注意或者發覺不到，它們就可以為所欲為。」

報導還指出，整流罩內的天線涵蓋了整個香港，重點應該是用來監聽香港民主派人士，以及外國使領館的電話、手機、電傳訊號。

旅美中國社會問題研究人士張健：「中共在目前這樣一個民主潮流，把它越來越孤立的情況之下，中共肯定是要加強它的統治地位，它自己本身知道，中共並沒有合法性，所以它把所有的民主國家的人都變成它的敵人，它在惶惶不可終日當中去執政，它一定是要知道人們想的是甚麼，人們如何去推翻它。包括箝制人的言論，引導人們的思想，然後制定出洗腦的方案。」

《漢和防務評論》創辦人平可夫表示，這是典型的解放軍總參謀部技術偵察部（總參三部）建設的訊號情報監聽天線，整流罩的基本結構與總參三部在新疆喀什、西藏中印邊界設立的監聽站類似。

平可夫強調，這根本不是甚麼雷達站，因為雷達站的天線越高越好，俯仰角的涵蓋範圍也應該是空曠的，但香港這個天線整流罩的位置低矮，「這樣的設計，對接收無線電訊號的目標而言，足以勝任」。

報導指出，監聽站也可能監聽香港政界人物的電話通訊，香港政府不可能知道這是甚麼樣的基地。

張成覺：「它不一定要通知香港政府，因為這樣的事情知道的人越多，對它沒有好處，何況它們根本沒有把香港政府看作是一個值得信賴依靠的角色，而且香港政界裡面有些高層人士的手機，它們也會監聽，它當然不希望讓香港特區政府知道這個情況。」

張健：「有可能香港政府並不知道，因為中共雖然一手扶植了香港政府，但是中共對香港政府是從來不放心的，因為扶植的人和中共自己的人，這在中共內部意識形態裡面，他們有本質的區別，說白了，香港這些人並沒有雙手沾滿人民的鮮血，不能進入到中共真正的核心內部。」

平可夫17號還向香港《蘋果日報》透露，台灣民眾的通訊也在中共的掌控之中，《漢和防務評論》明年2月號會有完整的報導。

據了解，《蘋果日報》7月曾報導，駐港中共軍隊3年前在大帽山頂獲得港府批地10萬呎，秘密興建軍用雷達設施和軍營，有軍人長期駐守，卻從沒有對外公布。

據香港《信報》報導，港府月前書面回覆質詢時，拒絕評論大帽山軍事用途詳情，只表示，駐港軍隊一直在香港履行防務職責，防務活動的具體資料屬軍事機密，不便公開。

採訪/易如 編輯/陳潔 後製/陳建銘

Report: PLA Monitor Telecommunications in Hong Kong

A dome built by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2011

at Tai Mo Shan, Hong Kong’s highest mountain, thought to be

a radar station, was recently reported to be a surveillance

station to intercept and record any radio signals in Hong Kong.

The latest Canada-based military affairs magazine,

Kanwa Asian Defence Monthly, reported a surveillance station

on top of Tai Mo Shan, 950 meters above sea level.

Experts analyzed, the dome measures 15.63 in diameter

and is far larger than aviation or weather radar.

Kanwa said the facility can intercept and record signals from

cellular phones, Wi-Fi networks and radios.

The size is large enough to listen to and record a variety of

communication signals through radio transmission.

Hong Kong writer Zhang Chengjue: “Cellular monitoring

should be very important to directly or closely grasp

the thoughts and movements of Hong Kongers.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worries about Hong Kong,

but does not want to intervene too obviously in the daily lives,

the law and freedom of Hong Kongers.

A facility on the mountain top is relatively less obvious or noticeable.

They can do whatever they want."

Kanwa also noted that the antenna covers the entire Hong Kong,

supposedly to tap the communications of the democracy camp

and foreign embassies.

US-based China social issue researcher Zhang Jian:

“In the current trend of democracy,

CCP is faced with increasing isolation.

Surely it works hard to strengthen its rule,

knowing that it lacks legality.

People in the democratic countries are its enemies.

It rules with anxiety, fearing people’s thoughts and ideas

will overthrow it.

It also develops its brainwashing program

just to clamp down on people’s words and guide their minds."

Andrei Chang said the installation is a typical intelligence

antenna of the PLA’s Unit 61398.

It is similar to other data mining facilities established

in Kashgar in the restive Xinjiang and Tibet

and along the border with India.

Andrei Chang stressed, because the higher the antenna

the better for a radar station;

the coverage area of the pitch angle should also be open.

But the position of the PLA facility is low and quite sufficient

to receive radio signals in Hong Kong.

Kanwa pointed out the facility could target telecommunication

of politicians and the HKSAR might not be aware of it.

Zhang Chengjue: “It does not have to notify the Hong Kong

government. It’s no good having too many people aware of this.

Besides, HKSAR was never a trustworthy entity to them.

Some executive politicians could also be monitored.

Of course they would not want the HKSAR know anything about it."

Zhang Jian: “It is likely the Hong Kong government does not

know anything about it.

Although CCP single-handedly propped up the HKSAR,

but never was assured.

To CCP ideology, there are essential differences between

the ones they cultivated and their own.

Frankly, these Hong Kongers have not stained their hands

with the blood of the people.

They will not really enter the inside core of the CCP."

Andrei Chang told Hong Kong’s Apple Daily,

communications in Taiwan are monitored by the CCP.

Relevant coverage will be available in Kanwa’s February issue

next year.

Apple Daily reported in July that HKSAR granted

a 100,000 sq ft area on top of Tai Mo Shan to the PLA.

The secret construction of military radar and barracks

stationed by military personnel was never announced .

Hong Kong Economic Journal, ejinsight, reported HKSAR has

declined to comment on the military usage on Tai Mo Shan

in a written reply last month.

It only stated that the PLA has been carrying out its defense

duties in Hong Kong.

As for details of the activities it will not be convenient

to reveal due to the nature of military secrets.

Interview/YiRu Edit/ChenJie Post-Production/Chen Jianming