【新唐人2014年01月25日訊】北京一些購買了銀行和保險公司的投資產品客戶，日前憤怒的向有關部門申訴他們10億元人民幣的投資損失，因為他們的投資到期後，銀行不能兌付。無獨有偶，江蘇鹽城市多家「農民資金互助合作社」，最近也陸續出現「人去錢空」的現象，好幾千戶民眾因數億元存款無法兌現而討說法。這是中國影子銀行業陷入「錢更荒」的最新證據嗎？請看報導。
北京市的一個公安分局門前，22號，聚集了十幾名投資者，他們要求公安局找回他們的血汗錢。
北京市民何玉京購買了人民幣100萬元、預期年收益率10%的「北京融典投資管理有限公司(Beijing Roll-In Investment Co.)」的基金。他說，之所以購買這款產品，就是因為本金、利息都有擔保。但是，現在，既沒有拿到承諾的收益，連本金也沒有拿回來。
重慶市的一名投資者萬霞也表示：融典，甚麼錢也沒付給他們。
「融典」產品的銷售對像，包括：中國平安保險股份有限公司、興業銀行、國建設銀行、民生銀行等大型金融機構的客戶。
投資者們還說，投資公司提供的發售說明書上有標準的風險披露，但表示，投資者的本金和利息，將由第三方提供擔保。
據了解，「融典」總額達10億元的基金，是投資到成都市政府支持的幾個公共住房項目上。
「融典事件」不是中國影子銀行體系的一個個案。
江蘇省鹽城市，近年開設了數十家所謂「農民資金互助合作社」，這些合作社的審批單位是當地的農業主管部門。開始時，合作社向儲戶承諾，存款到期後不僅可得利息，還能分紅，從而吸引了大批當地民眾存款。
但從去年初開始，合作社陸續出現錢荒。目前很多合作社已經無錢兌付而關門。
其實，目前鹽城市還有一些地方政府批准的投資公司也出現了問題，不僅公司關門，負責人也逃之夭夭。
當地民眾開始到政府討說法。
美銀美林(Bank of America Merrill Lynch)的分析師，在1月16號發佈的一份報告中說，影子銀行貸款出現違約的速度，似乎在迅速加快。
例如，「中誠信託投資有限責任公司(China Credit Trust Co.) 」和「中國工商銀行」，最近幾週面臨越來越大壓力，它們需要避免讓投資者面臨30億元人民幣的損失，而這筆投資產品，是通過「工商銀行」出售給投資者的。
大陸金融分析師任中道：「局部性、區域性的危機已經開始爆發了。就拿信託來說，去年就有十幾款出現兌付危機，目前到月底還有一個信託也出現兌付危機。其實這個風險已經是很大了。」
大陸金融分析師任中道表示，中國僅銀行理財部分，已達到11萬億的規模，如果不能正常兌付，老百姓損失非常大。但在銀行沒有公開的破產條例上，銀行對理財產品不負有責，投資者得自擔風險。
大陸「廣發證券」2012年底發佈的研究報告——《陽光下的影子——中國影子銀行分析》說，目前從廣義信用仲介角度測算，中國影子銀行總規模大約在30萬億左右。
對於如此大規模的影子銀行，中國銀監會首席顧問瀋聯濤去年9月卻聲稱，「中國影子銀行風險完全可控，個別有問題，但是系統沒有問題。」
中國民間投資顧問鄭先生：「審計署最近一個通告，各地政府負責償還的債務共20多萬億，這是天文數字。20多萬億，如果這個錢要拿出來還的話，從哪裏把錢變出20多萬億？」
中國民間投資顧問鄭先生指出，中共地方政府聯合銀行把很多債務轉嫁到擔保公司、信託控股、信用社等第三方上，讓他們去接盤。但這些利用了民間熱錢的第三方，會率先出問題。
鄭先生認為，地方債帶來的金融風險不可避免。
美國「南卡羅萊納大學艾肯商學院」教授謝田指出，「影子銀行」和「地方債」注定要破產。破產的時間，就是中共上層決定撒手不管、或想管但又心有餘、力不足的時候。而這一天，注定會來到。
採訪/易如 編輯/宋風 後製/蕭宇
Shadow Banking Money Shortage More Severe;
Investors Lose Everything
Some customers who bought investment products at banks
and insurance companies in Beijing recently complained
angrily to relevant departments that they lost money.
When their investments matured, the banks couldn’t pay
back 1 billion yuan.
The same thing happened to several
rural financial cooperative institutions.
Thousands of people appealed as they couldn’t cash
hundreds of thousands yuan in bank savings.
Is this new evidence that China’s shadow banking
has a money shortage issue? Please see the report.
More than 10 investors gathered in front of a public security
branch in Beijing on January 22, asking the public security
to help getting their hard-earned money back.
Beijing citizen He Yujing bought 1 million yuan in the funds
of Beijing Roll-In Investment Co. that was estimated to have
10% yield per year.
He said the reason he bought the product was because
its guarantee for the principal and interest.
But it hasn’t returned the profit it promised
and not even the principal amount.
Wan Xia, an investor in Chongqing City also indicates that
Beijing Roll-In didn’t return anything to them.
The target of Beijing Roll-In includes customers of China
Ping An Insurance Co. Ltd., China Construction Bank,
Minsheng Bank, Industrial Bank, and other large institutions.
The investors also said the investment company has a risk
disclosure on their prospectus that says the principal and
interest of the investors will be guaranteed by a third party.
Beijing Roll-In has funds totalling 1 billion yuan invested in
several public housing projects supported by Chengdu City.
The Beijing Roll-In case is not a single case
in China’s shadow banking system.
Several dozen rural financial cooperative institutions were
opened in Salt City of Jiangsu Province in recent years.
The local agricultural department is the unit
to approve these cooperative institutions.
At the beginning, the cooperative institutions promised
depositors that they get not only interest but also a bonus
when the deposit matures, which attracted many local
residents to deposit money there.
But the cooperative institutions started to have
money shortage since the beginning of last year.
A lot of the cooperative institutions have shut down,
because they have no money to pay back.
In fact, some investment companies approved by local
government in Salt City have also had problems.
Those companies closed, and
the responsible persons escaped.
Local residents have started to seek
explanations from the government.
In a report published on January 16, analyst of Bank of
America Merrill Lynch says breach of contract among
shadow banking seems to appear more and more often.
For instance, China Credit Trust Co. and Commercial Bank
of China have had more and more pressure in recent weeks.
They need to avoid 3 billion yuan of loss to the investors.
Those investment products were sold
to investors via Commercial Bank.
Ren Zhongdao, Mainland financial analyst:
“Localized, regional crisis has already begun.
Take trusts as an example, there were 10 trusts with a pay
out crisis, and there’s another one by the end of the month.
The risk has already become very big."
Ren indicates that China’s bank financing has reached
1.1 billion yuan.
If they can’t pay money back, everyday peoples’ loss
will be extremely big.
But on the Bankruptcy Ordinance of banks, not open to
the public, it says banks are not responsible to financial
products, and investors are at their own risk.
Mainland Guangfa Securities published a research report
at the end of 2012 “Shadows under the sunshine – China’s
shadow banking analysis".
This says the total size of China’s shadow banking is around
30 trillion yuan, based on Guangfa Securities estimation.
Facing such a big size of shadow bankings, however,
China Banking Regulatory Commission chief adviser,
Shen Liantao, said last September, “China’s shadow
banking risk is completely under control.
There are some individual problems,
but there’s no problem with the system."
Civil investment consultant Mr. Zheng: “Recently the Audit
Commission published a notice that local governments are
responsible to pay back more than 2 billion yuan of debts.
That’s an astronomical figure. Where do they get 2 billion?"
Mr. Zheng indicates the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
local governments unite with banks to pass on the debts to
security companies, trusts holdings, credit unions and other
third parties. But those third parties will have problems first.
Mr. Zheng believes that financial risks due to local debts
are inevitable.
Professor Xie Tian at School of Business in University of
South Carolina points out that shadow banking and local
debts are destined to break.
The time of their bankruptcy is when the CCP high level
decides to give up, or when it wants to take care of it but
has no strength. And this day is destined to come.
Interview/YiRu Edit/SongFeng Post-Production/XiaoYu